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For decades, the focus of modern political history was 
restricted to the realm of politics, emphasizing issues such 
as parties, elections or the role of the press, for example. 
Economic history, on the other hand, was primarily inter-
ested in working with quantitative data over the longue 
durée or monographs of precise sectors or businesses. 
Moreover, economists have had a specific relationship to 
history since the market has generally been interpreted as 
an institution that can only be understood in the very 
longue durée. The historiographical shifts of the last twen-
ty years have slowly changed this situation as the history of 
the state and economic policy has been reintegrated into 
the field of political history (Baruch and Duclert, 2000). 
Thanks to the influence of early modernists, modern histo-
rians have begun to consider economic policy and state 
intervention. Issues such as consumption, that had been 
left aside, have been placed back on the historiographical 
agenda revealing the links between consumption practices 
and public debate (Chatriot et al., 2006). While this work 
has been influenced by cultural history it does not fall fully 
into that sub-field. Th  e juridical regulation of fraud, espe-
cially in the realm of food and drugs (Stanziani, 2005), the 
management of shortages in times of war, or the measures 
that determine access to credit are some of the various 
forms of state intervention that take place in this area. 
Some markets have generated studies by different social 
sciences on areas like the French wine market, whose con-
struction and regulation is now well-known (Laferté, 2006; 
Chauvin, 2010) or more recently the fruits market (Bernard 
de Raymond, 2013). 
To illustrate these new trends and in an effort to avoid an 
arid historiographical paper, I would like to offer a reflec-
tion on an area I have been exploring (Chatriot et al., 
2012; Chatriot, 2013), specifically the history of the grain 
market, and the difficult process of its regulation in France 
during the first half of the twentieth century. In terms of 
agricultural policy, this choice allows me to follow the 
diversity of actors who intervened in this political process. 
During the summer of 1936, the Popular Front govern-
ment created a National Inter-professional Grain Office 
(Office national interprofessionel du blé, ONIB). This new 
entity was the culmination of a long debate and numerous 
previous measures that reveal the functioning of Third-
Republic institutions. Moreover, this new institution, creat-
ed by the socialists, was paradoxically maintained by the 
reactionary regime of Marechal Petain, and even more 
surprisingly, was kept under the Liberation and up to the 
present day. The choice to study the creation of this insti-
tution also corresponds to a more methodological reflec-
tion. 
Grain Crises 
“Grain is a product of the soil, and from this perspective, it 
belongs to economic and trade policy. It must also be seen 
as a basic need for public order and, from this point of 
view, it belongs to the realm of politics and the Reason of 
State”. This speech from the Abbot Galiani in his polemi-
cal, Dialogue sur le commerce des blés, (1770) is an ap-
propriate point of departure for examining the question of 
grain in the twentieth century. Following the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, which were marked by regular 
harvest revolts and the question of adequate provisions 
(Bourguinat, 2001), the deregulation of prices brought 
forward once again the question of public policy and state 
regulation. 
Confronted by the old problem of regulating a market that 
was a necessity for the population as a whole, public au-
thorities (legislative, executive and administrative) managed 
crises of over-production and the destabilization of the 
international market after World War I. During the 1920s 
and 30s, grain was consistently perceived as the question. 
It was presented as a market to protect or as prices that 
needed to be taxed. To the old problem of unpredictability 
– bad harvests necessitated imports while good years re-
quired exports – was added the shock of a world war. The 
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equilibrium that protected French farmers through protec-
tionist policies and tariffs introduced at the end of the 
nineteenth century was no longer viable (Lebovics, 1988; 
Aldenhoff-Hubinger, 2002; Chatriot, 2010). 
With the war, Russia no longer exported and European 
production was in an upheaval. At first, there was a sharp 
rise in prices due to increased dependence on production 
from abroad. While peasants initially celebrated this situa-
tion, governments were concerned with a general decrease 
in buying power [“la vie chère”], and quickly, the situation 
changed. Farmers were suddenly confronted with the 
disorderly increase of supply, technical innovations and a 
static demand (Stovall, 2012). This led to new crises in 
1928 and again at the beginning of the 30s up to 1933 
when good harvests led to the collapse of grain prices. 
Previously, the instruments of state intervention in agricul-
tural policy were limited to protective tariffs based on sub-
sidies, incentives for export, and quotas. However, these 
measures were quickly shown to be insufficient for radical 
market variations. Confronted with these fluctuations, new 
groups dealt with the question of grain in France and in-
ternationally. Until now, few historians have explored the 
series of conferences on grain that took place in Rome in 
1927, Geneva in January 1930, in Rome in March and 
April 1930 and especially in London in May 1931 then in 
August 1933 with the creation of the International Wheat 
Advisory Committee (Graevenitz, 2009). 
Agricultural unions reemerged across France as the histori-
cal division between the unions of large property holders 
and the unions of republican orientation tied to mutualist 
institutions was replaced by new confederations (Barral, 
1968). At the same time, a specialized union developed, 
the General Association of Grain Producers. This associa-
tion, founded in 1924, emerged out of the grain crisis 
(Pesche, 2000). 
Above all, grain producers demanded a high price for grain 
as opposed to politicians who wanted to drive prices down 
to satisfy their constituents. The association was tied to the 
Chambers of Agriculture and stated in 1929: “If our grain 
policy must remain subordinated to bread policy, which is 
itself subject to the demagogical influences of politics and 
the press, we might as well give up any hope of maintain-
ing grain production or technical innovation in this area in 
France” (Rémond, Hallé, 1929, 35). According to this logic, 
grain producers were opposed to the increasingly modern-
ized and well-structured millers of the inter-war period. 
Furthermore, beyond new specializations in agricultural 
production, various political movements were actively seek-
ing support in rural France during the 1930s (Paxton, 
1997; Bensoussan, 2006). 
The legal measures that followed as a result are worthy of 
special attention. A first law “on the grain trade” was 
adopted on December 1, 1929 and was quickly completed 
on April 1, 1930. These laws gave de facto power to the 
Minister of Agriculture to intervene by decree on the origin 
and nature of grain used in mills. This was an essential 
measure because behind its technical appearance, it creat-
ed a specific type of protectionism. On April 30, 1930, a 
law was proposed against the speculation on the grain 
trade through the creation of a permanent stock of grain 
and flour. This law was completed with a supplementary 
measure in the law of April 7, 1932 when the cost of stor-
ing grain became an essential question. 
Renewed price variations quickened the rhythm of laws 
throughout 1933. On January 26, a law was voted to 
“protect the grain market”, with the aim of financial inter-
vention to promote stock surpluses and control prices. On 
April 14, a law authorized the Minister of Agriculture to 
grant subsidies to encourage the use of indigenous grain 
for use other than human food and alcohol—a strong 
symbolic statement that was made necessary by surpluses 
and a collapse of prices. July 10, another important sym-
bolic step was taken with the establishment of a minimum 
price for grain. While it was only in force for a brief period, 
the law set out all the controls that were made possible for 
controlling the market. The difficulties of executing the law 
forced the vote of December 28, 1933 reforming a num-
ber of articles. 
Additional laws were passed in March and July 1934. The 
law of December 24, 1934 was presented as “an attempt 
to clean up the grain market”. It followed a decree of 
October 1934 that had attempted the delicate operation 
of codifying all the legislation on the issue. Next there was 
an attempt to return to a free-trade approach against the 
restrictive measures established by the law of July 1933. 
The consequence however was that the bottom fell out of 
prices. Multiple technical laws were passed in the spring of 
1935 and July 13, 1935 and the use of decree-laws al-
lowed for a first series of radical measures that were com-
pleted during the summer and through October 1935. The 
decree-law of October 30 returned to a certain number of 
previous measures by suppressing special taxes on produc-
tion. 
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A first set of conclusions may be drawn from this quick 
overview. First, one must consider what a specialist of the 
agricultural question justly referred to as “the soliciting of 
Parliament among grain producers” in 1936 (Salleron, 
1936, 421). Since members of parliament were sensitive to 
the question of grain prices, the agrarian lobby maintained 
a certain influence. While some laws took years to pass, 
and were blocked by the Senate, they were all ultimately 
voted in. In the political system of the French Third Repub-
lic, the Parliament exercised a certain superiority in deci-
sion-making for the economic and social policies. 
The second conclusion becomes clear in the inadequacy of 
the successive choices. Independent of the more or less 
liberal, statist, or professional approaches, the principle 
trait of all these attempts at regulation was the incapacity 
to find a form of intervention adequate for the grain mar-
ket. The measures were often considered illusory because 
there was insufficient credit to implement them and be-
cause the state did not control the wholesalers. Many were 
critical of this “enormous mass of laws, decrees and acts 
that are successively regulating our grain trade,” and that 
can only be explained by “the errors of legislators in the 
area, the lack of an overall plan, demagogical solutions, 
and lack of familiarity with the most fundamental econom-
ic laws.” (Touzet, 1936, 6). 
Institutions between the State, the 
Market and Individuals 
The creation of a Grain Bureau occupied a central place in 
the great reforms of the Popular Front. The parliamentary 
debates on this entity were particularly vigorous during the 
summer of 1936. The institutionalization was immediately 
commented upon by numerous legal economists that were 
interested in the forms of regulation that are now referred 
to as a planned economy. By examining the creation of this 
institution, I would like to present broader conclusions on 
how to study institutions and their role in the political 
regulation of the economy. 
In his doctoral thesis of 1934, Jean Sirol saw the Grain 
Office as “the proof of Parliament’s will to bring forth a 
powerful and competent organization that is separate 
from itself: this is an implicit, and particularly interesting, 
recognition of parliament’s inability, either due to the slow 
nature of parliamentary procedure or its incompetence, to 
handle countless contemporary economic problems.” (Si-
rol, 1934, 370-371) For this young jurist, the institution 
“mark[ed] the progress of state socialism and reveals that 
it is not at all revolutionary, but, to the contrary, regulates 
and plans the national economy. Moreover, there is no 
doubt that among the masses, there is a new fascination 
for these complex organizations, nourished by considerable 
sums of money and whose impact on the economy is 
without question as long as it represents the state. This is 
the result of a trend that is directly opposed to liberal ide-
als. A trend one sees not only in France, but also in the 
entire world and perhaps even more so in other countries 
(USA, USSR, Italy, Germany, Austria and Switzerland)” 
(Sirol, 1934, 371). The question of the comparison of the 
situations on an international scale is very important of 
course (Solberg, 1987; Way, 2013). Obviously, the ques-
tion spread far beyond the realm of grain market man-
agement. 
The project for a national grain office had a long history 
among socialists (Lynch, 2002). They had proposed it to 
Parliament as early as January 1925 and again in October 
1929 in the form of an “institution for complete control 
over grain imports and a national fertilizer office.” The idea 
was taken up again through individual efforts in 1929 and 
1934 but it appeared for many years to be too ideological-
ly charged and the legislative and regulatory solutions were 
too limited. 
The situation changed with the reponse by the President of 
the Council, Léon Blum, to the massive strikes that led to 
the Matignon Accords, and with the important social laws, 
published in the Journal official on June 26, 1936, on paid 
vacation, collective bargaining, and the 40-hour work 
week. The leftist government sought the creation of the 
Grain Office for the agricultural sector. While the most 
famous laws were voted through quickly without opposi-
tion in the Senate, the agricultural questions remained 
problematic. The bill, allowing for the creation of a profes-
sional office controlled by the state as a response to the 
failures of previous legislation, was presented as early as 
June 18, 1936. 
The text was quickly attacked however. Long debates in 
the two houses led to modifications to the text in July and 
August. Leon Blum stepped in to support the Minister of 
Agriculture, Georges Monnet, and the law was finally 
voted through in the last session of August 15, 1936. The 
debate focused on various elements: the status of the 
regulating body (the office was a public entity, a category 
of institution that was flexible but greatly criticized during 
the thirties); the problem of its leadership, given the inter-
professional nature of the office; the question of how to 
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fix grain prices annually; the creation of organizations for 
grain storage that were separate from the power of 
wholesalers; and, lastly, the organization of a monopoly 
for managing imports and exports. Georges Monnet’s 
other projects, including the expansion of the regulation of 
markets in the context of collective bargaining with the 
possibility of necessary extension by the minister, were also 
blocked by the Senate. The inter-professional nature of the 
Grain Bureau was a particularly tricky point of debate. The 
professional relations between producers of wheat, millers, 
bakers and consumers (represented by trade unions) were 
sometimes difficult. Another source of conflict was the 
suspicion that the Government wanted to establish total 
state control over the wheat market. Opposition to the 
creation of the Grain Bureau often took extreme turns in 
the press in the form of caricature or denunciation. Joseph-
Barthélemy, a conservative jurist and editorialist for Le 
Temps, wrote on July 28, 1936: “The well-stocked Grain 
Office has nothing to say… the plan is to cage off agricul-
ture by leaving each one his niche and his reward. Such 
efforts are worthy of dogs.” 
However, reactions to the actual creation of the institution 
varied. In her study of Breton peasants, the political scien-
tist Suzanne Berger has shown that the “Landernau [the 
Central Office of Mutualist Agricultural Works of the Finis-
tère] protested against the authoritarian creation of prices 
fixed by the state, but benefited from the fact that the law 
asked producers to stock grain for the creation of a grain 
cooperative with access to the necessary silos. […] The 
Grain Office was the creation of a Leftist government that 
Landernau feared and detested, but it actually meant a 
quasi-monopoly on the grain trade in Finistère by the cen-
tral office.” (Berger, 1975, 154). Some figures who were 
opposed to the Grain Bureau had already pointed this out: 
“There is no sense in burying one’s head in the sand. The 
Grain Office has been welcomed with satisfaction 
throughout the peasant world. The discussions that have 
unfolded on the level of ideology have left them indiffer-
ent. Undoubtedly, the office appears to be an improve-
ment to the previous situation.” (Leroy, 1939, 75). 
The ONIB was an inter-professional public organization, 
with producers, wholesalers, handlers, consumers and 
administrators. Its most important responsibilities were the 
fixing of prices, storage, and a monopoly on imports and 
exports. The fact that the harvests of 1936 and 1937 did 
not produce a surplus guaranteed the ONIB’s creation. 
Problems did not emerge until the harvest of 1938 and 
functional difficulties that led to the reforms of the decree-
laws of July 29, 1939. 
A thorough examination of this new institutional form in 
France may also generate foreign comparisons, especially 
when other experiences could serve as a model or a coun-
ter-model (the Canadian Wheat Board (MacGibbon, 1952), 
cooperative experiences in Italy and Germany, or the State 
Grain Company in Czechoslovakia). The question of the 
French colonies can be also raised in the study of agricul-
tural policies (Swearingen, 1985). 
Choosing to study an institution in order to analyze eco-
nomic policy is a means of responding to essential ques-
tions. Of course, it is influenced by the neo-institutionalism 
of economists and political scientists. But it also corre-
sponds to advancements in the History of Science and 
reflections on the scale of historical analysis. This is not a 
descriptive administrative history but rather a means of 
framing large-scale problems within concrete debates. The 
institutional scale allows for a consideration of the origin of 
sources: that of each document, but also the relationship 
between them that constitutes the very basis of the ar-
chives: working on institutional sources forces us to reflect 
on the institutional techniques themselves and on the 
practices of its members. 
The example of creating an institution necessitates an 
investigation of multiple temporalities: 1) the emergence of 
often contradictory doctrines; 2) the experiences inspired 
by precise problems; 3) the actual decision to create the 
institution; and finally, 4) the continual creation that trans-
forms an institution over time. In this analysis, one must 
reconsider other possible solutions to the same problem, 
and locate the diversity of debates around such a project 
(Chatriot, 2002). 
Once the institution is created, an institutional study has 
the advantage of avoiding a simple discursive analysis. It 
allows for an understanding of functional practices. One 
can study the members of the institution, their origins, 
their connections, their affinities and relationships to other 
institutions (which sometimes offers an understanding of a 
network of institutions) (Lemercier, 2003). The research in 
this field is not restricted to a systematic prosopography. 
Rather, it must be adapted to a given institutional form to 
fully utilize the merits of a method that is built on an insti-
tution’s specificities. The study of the institution must con-
sider juridical constraints as well as concrete elements 
(budget, personnel, rhythm of work). It is also a question 
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of understanding the progressive dynamics of the institu-
tion, the conflicts that it encounters, its place in the pro-
cess of public decision making, its opportunities for consul-
tation, expertise, recourse, arbitration or sanction. 
Obviously, French agricultural policy of the first half of the 
twentieth century cannot be reduced to the regulation of 
the grain markets. However, grain was one of its most 
symbolic and important components. Moreover, its influ-
ence was essential over the long term because, beyond the 
Grain Office’s existence throughout the century, one must 
consider that this type of regulation (decisions on regulat-
ed prices made collectively, organization of storage, pro-
tectionist measures) was at the heart of the first European 
agricultural policy (Noël, 1988; Fouilleux, 2003; Knudsen, 
2009). 
However, one must also consider that in spite of the fact 
that rural studies have had a strong influence on history 
and sociology (Hervieu, Purseigle, 2013), the functioning 
and the administration of agriculture are still relatively 
unexamined. Certainly, the phase of agricultural moderni-
zation of the 1960s has fascinated social scientists, as have 
the links among agricultural union members with rightist 
political parties. But the question of agricultural policy has 
been largely forgotten and too often reduced to a simple 
conflict of interests. 
Through the example of the debates on grain regulation, I 
have tried to insist on the connection between public poli-
cy and institutions, on the weight of past experiences and 
the question of the form of economic organization. I have 
also focused on the relationship between union actors that 
defended their interests but were also carriers of a tech-
nical expertise (Rabier et al., 2007). 
The question of agricultural policy is also informed by spa-
tial considerations, as it takes place on local, regional, and 
international levels. The international crisis of the grain 
markets in the 1930s forces us to change frames of refer-
ence in order to better understand the choices made. It 
forces us to examine international organizations, not only 
from the logic of diplomatic history but also from the logic 
of political history (Rosental, 2006; Ribi Forclaz, 2011). 
Certain international actors of this market, such as for 
example the big companies of the grain trade are very 
understudied (Morgan, 1979). We also have to study bet-
ter the phenomena of speculation on this type of market. 
The crisis during the 1930s could be compared with the 
great crisis on American market at the end of the XIXth 
Century (Norris, 1902; Levy, 2012). 
In the context of French politics, the difficulties of finding 
an adequate form of regulation is tied to a particular mo-
ment in the history of the Third Republic, with the different 
obstacles of the 1930s and the rupture that was brought 
on by the Popular Front (Nord, 2010). 
Other examples from Modern History could be chosen to 
explore political history approaches to economic and social 
questions. At the crossroads of legal and economic history, 
one could follow the question of the progressive codifica-
tion of labor law or more generally the evolution of social 
protection (Chatriot et al., 2011). Fiscal questions have also 
been recently drawn out of the world of specialists in fi-
nancial history and have found a more appropriate place in 
the field of political history with the question of consent to 
taxation (Delalande, 2011; Huret, 2014). 
There again, far from a political history reduced to parlia-
mentary debates or elections, recent research has led to an 
understanding of the plurality of actors and the institutions 
at play. Only a complex vision of the history of the state 
(Sawyer, 2012) that is open to social elements can help us 
understand questions that have been left aside for far too 
long by historians. 
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